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Rather too often, opponents of legally recognizing same-sex marriage
contend that polygamy is next.2 As far as I can see, the notion that
polygamy is going to follow same-sex marriage presumes that when
you change marriage once, or change it substantially, anything goes.
Philosopher John Corvino has written about what he calls the PIB
argument: the idea that after same-sex marriage, polygamy, incest,
and bestiality are fair game. He is not a fan of the argument.3 Frankly,
I too find it difficult to follow the slippery slope. There have been
many significant changes to the law of marriage in the past. Married
women acquired civil rights. It became possible to marry someone
of a different religion. It became possible to obtain a civil divorce.
To my knowledge, these changes didn’t generate concerns about
whether polygamy was next. But since people raise the slippery slope,
I shall attempt briefly to respond.
A caveat is in order at the outset. I am not undertaking a nor-
mative evaluation of the appropriate policy responses to polygamy. I
am not treading on philosophical ground, pronouncing on personal
autonomy versus community self-preservation. I am addressing the
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question of what legal impact the recognition of same-sex marriage
might have regarding polygamy as a recognized form of civil mar-
riage. I thus bracket the constitutionality of the present criminal pro-
hibition, as well as the thorny issues that polygamous marriages valid-
ly performed abroad raise for private international law and immigra-
tion policy.
My contribution to the discussion is two-fold. The first point
concerns the way in which same-sex marriage litigation – Halpern4
and the cases in other provinces, and the reference to the Supreme
Court of Canada5 – understands the relationship between civil mar-
riage and religious marriage. I argue that some of these sources under-
state the relationship of opposition between religious and civil treat-
ments of marriage. As I shall explain, the state is not only free to
regulate marriage distinctly from religious regulation. Rather, at times
it actually rejects religious ideas of marriage. The impact of this obser-
vation is that religious practices of polygamy in no way entail that
the state adjust civil marriage to embrace such practices. The sec-
ond point concerns the relationship between Halpern et al. and the
private law of marriage and of the family. I argue that the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage is not only a consequence of constitu-
tional litigation. It also reflects incremental change to the private
law of the family. Same-sex marriage has roots in private law amend-
ments, whereas as yet, polygamy does not.
I begin with Professor Nick Bala’s recent report for Status
of Women Canada, in which he argues that same-sex marriage and
polygamy are distinguishable.6 He makes four points. I will men-
tion them briefly, to avoid covering the same ground and also to
show how my own contribution to the conversation is somewhat dif-
ferent.
First, the popularity point. Far fewer Canadians favour legal-
ization of polygamy than favour same-sex marriage. Second, the
question of cost and impact. Same-sex marriage does not affect the
concept of monogamy. Same-sex marriages impose no economic
costs, beyond regular costs related to marriages. By contrast, polyg-
amous marriages would have significant cost ramifications for the
state and for employers in that it might require payment of spousal
benefits to two or more spouses of an employee or principal ben-
eficiary. Third, the harm issue. No evidence indicates that same-sex
marriage harms anybody. By contrast, Professor Bala reads the lit-
erature as showing that polygamy inflicts psychological and emo-
tional harm on women and detrimentally affects children’s develop-
ment. I am neither endorsing nor criticizing Professor Bala’s take
on the existing literature. I am simply reporting his argument. Fourth,
and finally, comes the doctrinal point of constitutional law. Same-
sex marriage claims were framed under the equality guarantee, sec-
tion 15, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.7 But
polygamy exacerbates gender inequality of both men and women.
What, then, do the same-sex marriage cases tell us about the
relationship between civil marriage and religious marriage? The
same-sex marriage cases rejected religious freedom claims formu-
lated under section 2(a) of the Charter. Courts rejected the idea,
submitted by the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto, that
a regime of civil marriage excluding same-sex couples infringed
their religious rights because their religious view of marriage includ-
ed same-sex marriage.8 The takeaway is that there is no entitlement
to have the state’s rules of civil marriage reflect religious rules.
From the standpoint of any single religion, the state’s definition of
civil marriage may be over-inclusive, or it may be under-inclusive.
That is, people may be married civilly whom their religion will not
recognize as such, or people may be religiously married whom the
state will not recognize as such. Such disjunctures between civilly
and religiously married persons are constitutionally acceptable. The
plain point for polygamy is that the presence of a religious prac-
tice per se does not call for adjusting the rules of civil marriage to
align with that practice.
Nor, however, is it the case that civil marriage and religious
marriage are completely unrelated. In Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, the Supreme Court of Canada made such hollow asser-
tions: “Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil insti-
tution.”9 Comparison with things that really are unrelated shows that
the relation between civil marriage and religious marriage is not
quite that. Jewish rites of religious male circumcision and the law
of bankruptcy are unrelated. Civil marriage, however, stands to reli-
gious marriage in a relationship of relevance. The key feature to
note is that the relationship is one of opposition and rejection. Some
of the core elements of civil marriage have been enacted and rede-
fined in conscious efforts to distance the regime of civil marriage
from religious marriage. And these enactments have been made over
the vocal opposition of religious opponents, in the effort to legis-
late fairly for a secular society.10
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A theory that civil marriage and religious marriage occupy
fully separate spheres isn’t tenable when reviewing the positive law
already in force. The Divorce Act includes civil impediments intend-
ed to induce one refractory spouse to facilitate his former spouse’s
religious remarriage.11 The provision was introduced to tackle the
problem of the Jewish divorce or get. This bit of the Act attests to
Parliament’s confidence that some values of civil marriage are appro-
priately telegraphed or exported towards religious marriage. I think
these values are equality, liberty, and autonomy. These are not nec-
essarily values that researchers associate with polygamy.
Not only, then, do religious claims not lead to a redefinition
of civil marriage. Rather, in at least a limited fashion, Parliament will
take secular values into account when determining how it wishes to
influence behaviour in the religious sphere. In brief, the presence of
a religious practice of polygamy does not lead to a constitutional
claim for civil marriage to incorporate such practices. If anything, it
is possible that Parliament will alter the rules of ostensibly civil
regimes so as to provide disincentives for a religious practice that it
determines to collide with secular values of equality, liberty, and
autonomy. It is time to turn to my second argument, concerning same-
sex marriage and private law.
Professor Bala has rather understated the path to same-sex
marriage. He did so when stating same-sex marriage didn’t infringe
upon monogamy and imposed no economic costs because it fits the
existing model of egalitarian monogamous marriage. The suggestion
is that there was no insuperable impediment to same-sex marriage in
other core notions of marriage. I argue that his account leaves out
the way in which changes to the law of marriage brought it closer,
as a civil institution, to the family practices of same-sex couples.
Same-sex marriage didn’t just fit into the existing model of marriage.
In the last decades, changes to marriage and family law have made
marriage thinkable for same-sex couples. I briefly recapitulate alter-
ations to the private law of the family that made same-sex marriage
thinkable and feasible.
One concerns spousal roles, and whether they are differenti-
ated or identical. Not long ago – especially in the province of Quebec
– civil marriage included roles sharply differentiated by the sex of
the respective spouses. It was only in 1964, just over forty years ago,
that married women obtained their civil emancipation under the Civil
Code of Lower Canada.12 Once both spouses have equal civil rights
and obligations in marriage, marriage is possible for two spouses of
the same gender.
Another set of changes concerns the relation between mar-
riage and children. The abolition of illegitimacy – the important dis-
tinction of parentage from marriage – shifted marriage’s fundamen-
tal vocation. Now that children’s status is determined independently
from the marital status of their parents, marriage becomes a relevant
concept for two persons whose relationship is not predicated upon
their producing offspring. So it is not just that same-sex marriage fits
into the existing marriage model. To put the point tendentiously, in
past decades, the marriage model that existed shifted, in many ways,
towards same-sex marriage.
It is not just these respects that are important. A number of
developments in private law contributed to the increasing thinkabili-
ty of same-sex marriage. A number of changes made it possible, from
a legal perspective, to view same-sex couples as familial and conju-
gal. There is a private-law genealogy of same-sex marriage that sharp-
ens the extent to which same-sex marriage and polygamy are distin-
guishable. Accounts reading same-sex marriage as exclusively a story
about section 15 of the Charter occlude this private law history. At
times, one gets the erroneous sense that judges interpreted the Charter
in a vacuum, instead of against the backdrop of legislative and judi-
cial changes to family law.13
There are many such relevant moments in which same-sex
couples are moving onto the map of family and marriage law. Some
of the moments are legislative, others judicial. Under the first federal
Divorce Act (1968), adultery was one ground for divorce. Homosexual
conduct was not, however, a species of adultery. Homosexual conduct
was a distinct ground for dissolution, classified as one of the “unnat-
ural offences.”14 Homosexual conduct was regarded as disgusting. Unlike
adultery, however, it wasn’t conjugal behaviour that threatened a mar-
riage by holding up an alternative conjugality. The provision was elim-
inated with the passage of the 1986 Divorce Act. But prior to that, at
least one judge stated that, given changing social attitudes towards
homosexuality, it had become appropriate to treat homosexual conduct
simply as garden-variety adultery.15 In an act of tacit law reform, homo-
sexual conduct had acquired the dignity of becoming adulterous. In the
context of a bitter divorce, in the wreckage of a marriage, this was
admittedly not a happy, Halpern-type moment. But it marked a step of
progress for the possibility of same-sex marriage.
33
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   È V .  2  N .  1   È P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Prior to Halpern, there were unjust enrichment cases involv-
ing same-sex couples. Claims equivalent to those made by opposite-
sex cohabitants were successfully made out.16 The feasibility of same-
sex couples as conjugal was authoritatively established in Egan v.
Canada.17 Egan—not, admittedly, a private law matter—concerned a
Charter claim that it was discriminatory for old age security legisla-
tion to define “spouse” for the purposes of its spousal allowance as
only an opposite-sex spouse. The claim was ultimately unsuccessful
on the merits, but in the process, the Supreme Court recognized sex-
ual orientation as a prohibited ground for discrimination purposes.
Moreover, five of the judges showed themselves to understand the
claimant couple as conjugal.18
In making out the equality claim in Halpern, a crucial step
was to establish the correct comparator group. To whom would the
court compare same-sex couples denied the right to marry? As an
equality claimant, if you can’t establish a favourable comparator
group, you lose right there. But in Halpern, the court accepted that
the appropriate comparator group was opposite-sex married couples.
It wasn’t other unmarried people. The comparison to opposite-sex
married couples depended upon the prior, extra-constitutional accept-
ability of same-sex relationships.
In my assessment, the early marriage challenges failed because
the groundwork outside, as well as under, the Charter hadn’t yet been
adequately laid. The first, unsuccessful same-sex marriage claim under
the Charter was Layland.19 The two majority judges rejected the claim
for a marriage license, although Greer J., dissenting, articulated a
strong claim that same-sex couples were families and entitled to marry.
Another failure, Egan, was decided narrowly. The claim for a redef-
inition of “spouse” failed as a result of a coalition of judges. Four
judges found there to be no violation of the equality right. Four judges
found there to be a violation that was not justifiable under the lim-
itation clause, section 1. Justice Sopinka, the swing judge, agreed that
there was a violation of section 15 but concluded that, in the circum-
stances, and given the necessity for society to change over time, the
violation was justifiable under section 1. Justice Sopinka’s concur-
rence, emphasizing the novelty of same-sex relationships, is an elo-
quent testimony to the need for a legal and social groundwork. Other
judgments not long afterwards reveal how quickly such foundations
may be laid.20
According to the best of my knowledge, there is no ground-
work for the social acceptability of polygamy, even remotely resem-
bling the established social acceptability of same-sex marriage. The
social acceptability of same-sex marriage resulted from work done
by gay and lesbian activists and rights claimants, over decades.21
To conclude this point, the question is not so much the doc-
trinal one about which Charter right is engaged, equality or religion.
It should instead be the sociological, cultural, and political inquiry
about the social context in which judges will interpret the Charter
when any claim for civil recognition of polygamy is eventually framed.
The interested observer should look for hints that civil recognition of
polygamous marriage is imminent, not in the law reports treating
same-sex marriage, but in the streets. Not until you see a polyga-
mists’ Pride Parade marching down Yonge Street or René Lévesque
Boulevard will things really be changing.
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